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Mr. Geoffrey Butler 
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: State v. Wesley Tuttle 
Case No. 20068 
Dear Geoff: 
Pursuant to provisions of 24(j) R. Utah S. Ct., appellant 
provides the Court with the following information for its 
consideration in connection with appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
which is currently pending before the Court. 
In respondent's Reply to Petition for Rehearing, respondent 
asserts that appellant did not refer to pages in the record to 
support his points on appeal. This is ludicrous in view of the 
fact that appellant's original Brief was replete with references 
to the record and the Petition for Rehearing which appellant filed 
simply refers to the facts as established and referred to in 
appellant's Brief. To suggest that this Court ought not consider 
the Petition for Rehearing because appellant failed to refer, once 
again, to the record appears to be absolutely incomprehensible. 
Furthermore, respondent does not contest the facts referred to by 
appellant, but simply says that appellant did not refer to the 
record. The facts, as articulated by appellant in the Petition for 
Rehearing, were facts established at trial and referenced in 
appellant's original Brief to this Court, and this Court ought not 
consider the fact that appellant did not refer specifically to the 
record in his Petition for Rehearing as any basis at all for 
denying his Petition for Rehearing. 
A significant case regarding harmless error was decided by 
the United States Supreme Court after appellant filed his Petition 
for Rehearing, but prior to the time that respondent replied to 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, yet respondent does not make 
any reference to that opinion in its response. 
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E;i^ x^ oc:vu m T ^ W ^ L I , „.s a copy of the case ol Carella v. California, 
U.S. , 4S Cr.L. 3097 (June 15, 1989), Counsel draws the 
Court's attention to the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia with 
whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join, 
concurring, wherein there is a detailed analysis of harmless error 
as it applies to a burden-shifting Sa_ndstrom i *v^ ~Ttiiv . 
— - ^w. *-.i ^  _, uie error complained of should not l>e sut ject 
harmless error analysis because it aborted the "basic trial 
process" involving Mr. "lut.tle's right to call witnesses to 
challenge the accuracy of an eye witness. 'it. is one thing to find 
the introduction of tainted eye witness testimony harmless. It is 
quite another to refuse to allow a criminal defendant the right *-•.-
explain to the trier of fact at a capital nrial the reasons wh i ; 
this court has now recoani?^^ '•'h;^ ~akes that testimony unworthy 
of belief. 
a :i. v-r^ I^^^L, t..*.,^  Court should allow appellant an 
opportunity to reargue the harmless r r m ioc~i?, ,,- orant the 
Pet i * i on for' Rehear i nq * 
An ; iQj.naJ and nj no copies oi ir : - pr '„ i ,.K,- : to 
j fjui | ../suari T- * he above-cited rule. 
Rf spc : , .. led, 




EUGENE JOHN CARELLA, APPELLANT 
u CALIFORNIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT, SUPERIOR 
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
[June 15, 1989] 
PER CURIAM. 
On March 24,1986, after a jury trial in the Municipal Court 
of Beverly Hills Judicial District, California, Appellant Eu-
gene Carella was convicted of grand theft for failure to return 
a rented car.1 At his trial, the court adopted the prosecu-
tion's requested instructions applying the statutory presump-
tions in California Vehicle Code Ann. § 10855 (West 1987),2 
and California Penal Code Ann. § 484(b) (West 1988).1 Spe-
cifically, over Carella's objection, the court charged the jury 
as follows: 
;i) "Presumption Respecting Theft by Fraud: 
Intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed if one who 
has leased or rented the personal property of another pursu-
ant to a written contract fails to return the personal property 
to its owner within 20 days after the owner has made written 
demand by certified or registered mail following the expira-
tion of the lease or rental agreement for return of the prop-
erty so leased or rented." 
(2) "Presumption Respecting Embezzlement of a Leased 
or Rented Vehicle: 
"Whenever any person who has leased or rented a vehicle 
wilfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle to its 
owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement 
has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embez-
zled the vehicle." App. 15. 
On appeal to the Appellate Department of the Superior 
Court, the prosecution confessed error, acknowledging that 
these two instructions unconstitutionally imposed conclu-
sive presumptions as to core elements of Carella's crime. 
The Appellate Department disagreed, however, and vali-
dated the presumptions on the ground that Carella "never 
offered testimony concerning the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed facts " Id., at 61. This disposition was so plainly 
at odds with prior decisions of this Court that we noted prob-
able jurisdiction, 488 U. S. (1988), and now reverse. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment de-
nies States the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless 
the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every ele-
ment of the charged offense. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 
364 (1970). Jury instructions relieving States of this burden 
violate a defendant's due process rights. See Francis v. 
Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U. S. 510 (1979). Such directions subvert the presumption 
1
 Carella was acquitted of the charged violation of California Vehicle 
Code Ann. § 10851(a) (West 1987), which provides that the nonconsensual 
taking or driving of a vehicle is a "public offense" if accomplished with the 
specific "intent either to permanently or temporarily" deprive the owner of 
title or possession. 
1
 California Vehicle Code Ann. § 10855 reads: "Whenever any person 
who has leased or rented a vehicle wilfully and intentionally fails to return 
the vehicle to its owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement 
has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle." 
1
 California Penal Code Ann. § 4840?) reads: "Except as provided in Sec-
tion 10855 of the Vehicle Code, intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed 
if one who has leased or rented the personal property of another pursuant 
to a written contract fails to return the personal property to its owner 
within 20 days after the owner has made written demand by certified or 
registered mail following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement 
for return of the property so leased or rented." 
of innocence accorded to accused persons, and also invade the 
truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases. 
We explained in Francis and Sandstrom that courts should 
ask whether the presumption in/question is mandatory, that 
is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the con-
text of the overall charge, could have been understood by 
reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if 
the State proves certain predicate facts. See Sandstrom, 
supra, at 514. The ^ prosecution understandably does not 
now dispute that the instructions in this case were phrased as 
commands, for those instructions were explicit and unquali-
fied to that effect and were not explained elsewhere in the 
jury charge to be merely permissive. Carella's jury was told 
first that a person "shall be presumed^ have embezzled" a 
vehicle if it is not returned within five days of the expiration 
of the rental agreement;" and second, that "intent to commit 
theft by fraud is presumed" from failure to return rented 
property within 20 days of demand. 
These mandatory directions directly foreclosed independ-
ent jury consideration of whether the facts proved estab-
lished certain elements of the offenses with which Carella 
was charged. The instructions also relieved the State of its 
burden of proof articulated in Winship, namely proving by 
evidence every essential element of Carella's crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The two instructions violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
The State insists that the error was in any event harmless. 
As we have in similar cases, we do not decide that issue here. 
In Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, at 515, the jury in a mur-
der case was instructed that the "law presumes that a per-
son intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 
We held that because the jury might have understood the 
presumption to be conclusive or as shifting the burden of per-
suasion, the instruction was constitutional error. There was 
a claim of harmless error, however, and even though the jury 
might have considered the presumption to be conclusive, we 
remanded for the state court to consider the issue if it so 
chose. 
In Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), we again said that a 
Sandstrom error is subject to the harmless-error rule. "Nor 
is Sandstrom error equivalent to a directed verdict for the 
State. When a jury is instructed to presume malice from 
predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 
U. S. 73, 96-97 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). In many 
cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so 
that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed 
the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause in-
jury. . . . In that event the erroneous instruction is simply 
superfluous: the jury has found, in Winship's words, 'every 
fact necessary' to establish every element of the offense be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Rose, supra, at 580-581 (footnote 
and citations omitted). We also observed that although we 
have the authority to make the harmless error determination 
ourselves, we do not ordinarily do so. Hence, we remanded 
the case for the lower court to make that determination in the 
first instance. 
We follow the same course here and reverse the judgment 
of the California court without deciding here whether no ra-
tional jury could find the predicate acts but fail to find the 
fact presumed. Ibid. Accordingly, the judgment of the Ap-
pellate Department is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE 
MARSHALL* and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the 
judgment. 
I agr£e ^th the Court that the decision below must be re-
versed, and that it is sensible to permit the state court to con-
duet harmless-error analysis in the first instance. I write 
separately, however, because the Court has only implicitly 
acknowledged (by quoting the passage that it does from Rose 
v. ClarK 478 U. S. 570, 580-681 (1986), see ante, at 4) what 
should be made explicit—that the harmless-error analysis ap-
plicable 'm assessing a mandatory conclusive presumption is 
wholly unlike the typical form of such analysis. In theusual 
case the harmlessness determination requires consideration 
of 'the trial record as a whole," Unitea States v. Hasting, 
461 U. s- 499, 509 (1983),' in order to decide whether the 
fact supPorted by improperly admitted evidence was in any 
event overwhelmingly established by other evidence, see, 
e. gtf tfilton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372-373 (1972); 
HarriiWton v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 254 (1969). Such 
an expensive inquiry would be error here, and I think it im-
portant both to explain why and to describe the mode of anal-
ysis th^t is appropriate. The Court's mere citation of Rose is 
inadequate to those ends, since, for reasons I shall describe, 
infra, & 5-6* that case itself is ambiguous. 
The Court has disapproved the use of mandatory conclu-
sive presumptions not merely because it "'conflicts] with the 
overriding presumption of innocence with which the law en-
dows tl*e accused/" Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 
*$& {$£>% a^stfxa% McrtmetU N. UmUd StaU%> 3A2. \L SL 
246, 275 (1952)), but also because it *"invade[s] [the] fact-
finding function* which in a criminal case the law assigns 
solely to the jury," 442 U. S., at 523 (quoting United States 
v. Unit** States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 446 (1978)). 
The constitutional right to a jury trial embodies "a profound 
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and 
justice administered." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 
155 (19&8)- It is a structural guarantee that "reflects] a fun-
dament^ decision about the exercise of official power—a re-
luctant to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of 
the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges." Id., at 156. 
A defendant may assuredly insist upon observance of this 
guarantee even when the evidence against him is so over-
whelming as to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
That is w n y theCourt has found it constitutionally impermis-
sible fof a judge to direct a verdict for the State. See United 
States v- MartinJLinem, Supply Co.; 430 U. S. 564, 572-573 
(1977). That is also why irtCarpenters v. United States, 330 
U. S. 3^ 5 (1947), the Court did not treat as harmless a jury 
instruction that mistakenly did not require express authori-
zation or ratification'to hold a* union criminally liable for its 
officers' participation in an antitrust conspiracy—regardless 
oi Ww overwhelrninfc'the evidence that authorization or rati-
fication in fact existed. ~ We said: 
"£To matter how strong the evidence may be of an associ-
ation's or organization's participation through its agents 
in the conspiracy, there must be a charge to the jury set-
ting out correctly the limited liability under [the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70] of such association or orga-
nisation for acts^ of its..agents.-* For a judge may not 
direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the 
evidence., There is no way of,knowing here whether the 
jury's verdict was.based on facts within the condemned 
instructions... or on actual authorization or ratification 
0f such acts . . . ." Id., at 408-409 (footnotes omitted). 
In other words, "the question is not whether guilt may be 
spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a 
jury according to the procedure and standards appropriate 
for cfiminal trials." Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 
607, <514 (1946). "Findings made by a judge cannot cure defi-
ciencies m the jury's findings as to the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant resulting from the court's failure to instruct it to 
find jtn element of the crime." Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 
376, 384-385 (1986). 
'Ypese pfxncip\es Tiecessafny crrcumscfit)e trie a^ aiia^ liftty 
of harmless-error analysis when a jury has been instructed to 
appl/ a conclusive presumption. If the judge in the present 
case had instructed the jury, "You are to apply a conclusive 
prestimption that Carella embezzled the rental car if you find 
that he has blue eyes and lives in the United States," it would 
not patter, for purposes of assuring Carella his jury-trial 
righk whether the record contained overwhelming evidence 
that he in fact embezzled the car. For nothing in the instruc-
tion would have directed the jury, or even permitted it, 
to consider and apply that evidence in reaching its verdict. 
And the problem would not be cured by an appellate court's 
determination that the record evidence unmistakably estab-
lished guilt, for that would represent a finding of fact by 
judges, not by a jury. As with a directed verdict, "the error 
in such a case is that the wrong entity judged the defendant 
guilty*" R°$e v- Clark, supra, at 578. 
F<?ur Members of the Court concluded as much in Con-
necticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73 (1983) (plurality opinion), 
which considered whether it could be harmless error to in-
struct a jury that "every person is conclusively presumed to 
intend the natural and necessary consequences of his act." 
Id., ^ 78. JUSTICE BLACKMUN wrote for the plurality: 
^kn erroneous presmnp'tio'n on a fosptiwA &em«ft tft ^  
crime renders irrelevant the evidence on the issue be-
cause the jury may have relied upon the presumption 
rather than upon that evidence. If the jury may have 
failed to consider evidence of intent, a reviewing court 
cannot hold that the error did not contribute to the ver-
dict. The fact that the reviewing court may view the 
evidence of intent as overwhelming is then simply irrele-
vant. To allow a reviewing court to perform the jury's 
function of evaluating the evidence of intent, when the 
jury never may have performed that function, would 
give too much weight to society's interest in punishing 
the guilty and too little weight to the method by which 
decisions of guilt are to be made." Id., at 85-86 (foot-
notes omitted). 
The plurality therefore determined—I think correctly—that 
the i*se °f conclusive presumptions could be harmless error 
only in those "rare situations" when "the reviewing court 
can t?e confident that [such an] error did not play any role in 
the jury's verdict." Id., at 87. The opinion mentioned as 
amotfg those "rare situations" an instruction establishing a 
conclusive presumption on a charge of which the defendant 
struction establishing a conclusive presumption with regard 
to an element of the crime that the defendant in any case ad-
mitted. Ibid. 
Another basis for finding a conclusive-presumption instruc-
tion harmless explains our holding two Terms ago in Pope v. 
Illinois, 481 U. S. 497 (1987). Although the error in instruc-
tion held to be harmless there was not a conclusive presump-
tion but rather misdescription of an element of the offense, 
the latter like the former deprives the jury of its factfinding 
role, and must be analyzed similarly. (Thus, as noted earlier, 
misdescription of an element of the offense has similarly been 
held not curable by overwhelming record evidence of guilt. 
See Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S., at 408-409.) In 
both convictions at issue in Pope the juries had been in-
structed to apply a "community standar[d]" in deciding 
45 CrL 3098 6-14-89 
*T allegedly obscene magazines, "'taken as a whole, 
5&rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'" 
'
V&S. at 498-499 (citation omitted). The Court con-
£*however, that the First Amendment required a dif-
§%riding: "whether a reasonable person would find such 
i ^ t h e material, taken as a whole." 481 U. S., at 501. 
%dmg necessary to convict the defendants, the Court 
%t the error was harmless. I joined that opinion only 
{Tl believed that no rational juror could plausibly have 
ffoie magazines utterly lacking in value under a commu-
h/indard and come to a different conclusion under a rea-
fp person standard. See id., at 504 (SCALIA, J., con-
V). In an appropriate case, a similar analysis could 
the conclusion of harmless error for a conclusive pre-
lum: When the predicate facts relied upon in the in-
gjiSh, or other facts necessarily found by the jury, are 
K ^ ^ l y related to the ultimate fact to be presumed that no 
Bj&g l^ jury could find those facts without also finding that 
ISggjdJe fact, making those findings is functionally equivalent 
n5i^ £ ^ e e*ement require to be presumed. The error 
iless because it is "beyond a reasonable doubt," Chap-
j-py, California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967), that the jury 
«j |^he facts necessary to support the conviction, 
ffhe ^Court's opinion does not discuss any of this precedent, gjjferjies exclusively upon citation of, and quotation from, 
5g$f^T Clark.* See ante, at 4. In that case we acknowl-
ffiSS the possibility of harmless error (and remanded for 
JgS^ination of that issue) with respect to an instruction 
jgggkj. that a killing has occurred, then it is presumed that the 
Stejiw was done maliciously. But this presumption may be 
gut ted " 478 U. S., at 574. In explaining why the 
fee of ^  ^permissible presumption, unlike the granting of a 
jjjj^^d verdict for the State, can in some circumstances be 
foeeme^ harmless error, we observed: 
trfThen a jury is instructed to presume malice from predi-
cate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts 
&Sanfc t rom v* Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979), is also cited, see ante, at 
8 but o^y (°r on*y Property) for the proposition that we need not conduct 
htrmle£*~€rror analysis ourselves, not for the proposition that harmless-
error aj^ysk « applicable. In Sandttrom we Mdecline[d] to reach" not 
oily th^ State's claim that the flawed instruction "constituted harmless 
error," frut a^so l^e defendant's claim that "in any event an unconstitutional 
Jury instruction on an element of the crime can never constitute harmless 
fggg^m 442 U.S., at 626-527. 
peyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In many cases, the 
predicate facts conclusively establish intent so that 
jio rational jury could find that the defendant committed 
£he relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause in-
jury. . . . In that event . . . the jury has found . . . 
<every fact necessary* to establish every element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." ld.s at 580-581 
(emphasis in original). 
•pj^ passage suggests the mode of analysis just discussed in 
com)ection with Pope. Were that all which Rose contained 
o n foe subject, or were the Court willing to make explicit 
t^j. the more usual harmless-error analysis does not apply, 
toda/s °P^ o n could be regarded as terse but not mislead-
fa~ Elsewhere, however, Rose says that usual harmless-
errof analysis is applicable: "Where a reviewing court can 
fod that the record developed at trial establishes guilt be-
yon(J a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been 
g i f t ed and the judgment should be affirmed," 478 U. S.f at 
579. see id., at 583. I therefore think it at best misleading to 
suggest without qualification that Rose governs here. 
gven if dose's more expansive description of the sort of 
jiar^iless-error analysis available is accepted with regard to 
the tyPe °f presumption at issue in that case—a rebuttable 
pre$umption—it need not (and for the reasons discussed 
a]30ve can not) be accepted for conclusive presumptions such 
ag
 tJiat in the present case. The Rose jury, instructed re-
garding a rebuttable presumption of malice, could—indeed, 
w a s compelled to—weigh the relevant evidence and decide 
whether the presumption had been overcome. It had made 
a fading regarding the elemental fact, and the only difficulty 
wa$ that the burden of proof had been placed upon the de-
fend*^ rather than the State. It is one thing to say that the 
effect of this erroneous burden-shifting will be disregarded if 
"th# r e c o rd developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a rea-
son^ble doubt"; it is quite another to say that the jury's fail-
ure to make any factual determination of the elemental fact— 
beC2Use of a conclusive presumption resting upon findings 
that do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elemen-
t s fact—will be similarly disregarded. 
jror these reasons, I concur only in the judgment of the 
Cot^ 
cHrlISTOPHER D. CERF, Washington, D.C. (ONEK, KLEIN & 
F A £ R , on the briefs) for appellant; ARNOLD T. GUMINSKI, Los 
Angeles County Deputy District Attorney (IRA REINER, Los Ange-
l e s bounty Dist. Atty., and HARRY B. SONDHEIM, on the briefs) 
for ^PPellee. 
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